|De dicto: statements about the nature of linguistic expressions and their consequences are de dicto. Concepts necessarily have certain characteristics, as opposed to objects (res) the properties of which are considered as contingent by many authors. See also de re, modality, necessity de re.|
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|Wolf II 209
KripkeVsDonnellan: his theory is correct, but does not refute Russell’s (better, because more consistent) theory - Distinction referential/attributive has nothing to do with distinction de re/de dicto (Donnellan ditto).
Wolf II 216
Donnellan/Kripke: de dicto: can be neither attributive nor referential: Quote not about object. (already Frege) - Referential: cannot be de re - e.g. "The number of planets is odd": is attributive, i.e. not about this exact subject "whatever" - "necessarily odd": just as attributive - E.g. "The murderer, no matter who, has committed the murder": just as attributive, but de re. - Indirect speech: neither referential nor attributive.
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984
K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993