Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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That clause: partial sentence, expresses e.g. a belief (propositional attitude). This content is intensional, i.e. it is not objective. For some authors, the partial sentence "that it is raining" is the name of the sentence "It is raining"._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Hartry Field on That-Clauses - Dictionary of Arguments
II 157 That-clause/Field: does not require a literal representation - e.g. "that snow is white" can be expressed in every language; it is speech-independent. Then a language (Ms) with ""p" means that p" is a special case of the language (M) with ""e" (whereby e is a subsentential expression and means, for example, "dog." That is, "<>" is a formal representation of our normal means of meaning attribution. ((s) the expression in tip brackets is our own.) Scheme characters: "p" and "e" here in relation to an individual, i.e. idiolect. >Idiolect, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention. II 158 Then "that p as I understand it now" must not be a literal representation. Tip bracket: it cannot be shown that "metacompact" does not mean I.e it has a particular epistemic status: it is not empirically doubtful. To say that a word means "rabbit," is simply to say... II 159 ...that it means the same as "rabbit" as I understand it in the actual moment. - ((s) In the actual world, in my idiolect). >Possible worlds, >Actual world, >Language community. II 160 Tip brackets: instead, for sentences, we can also assume that-clauses. II 171 Understanding: For example, if I do not understand "grug", I will not accept the following: "grug" means >Content._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 |