Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

 
That clause: partial sentence, expresses e.g. a belief (propositional attitude). This content is intensional, i.e. it is not objective. For some authors, the partial sentence "that it is raining" is the name of the sentence "It is raining".

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

 
Books on Amazon
II 157
That-clause/Field: does not require a literal representation - e.g. "that snow is white" can be expressed in every language - speech-independent - then a language (Ms) with ""p" means that p" is a special case of the language (M) with ""e" (whereby e is a subsentential expression and means, for example, "dog." That is, "<>" is a formal representation of our normal means of meaning attribution - ((s) the expression in angle brackets is our own) - Scheme characters: "p" and "e" here in relation to an individual, i.e. idiolect.
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II 158
Then "that p as I understand it now" must not be a literal representation. - angle bracket: it cannot be shown that "metacompact" does not mean , even if I do not know exactly what it means. - I.e it has a particular epistemic status: it is not empirically doubtful. To say that a word means "rabbit," is simply to say,
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II
that it means the same as "rabbit" as I understand it in the actual moment. - ((s) In the actual world, in my idiolect).
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II 160
Angle brackets: for sentences, we can also assume that-clauses.
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II 171
Understanding: For example, if I do not understand "grug", I will not accept the following: "grug" means - and even if I accept it, it would not count as believe.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980


> Counter arguments against Field

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-09-24