|Continuants: temporally extended entities as opposed to events or occurrences. There is a debate about whether continuants themselves can have temporal parts. See also endurantism, perdurantism, ontology, person, four-dimensionalism.|
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Modal continuants/Lewis/(s): if individuals can consist of the mereological sum of all their counterparts, they could also be modal continuants - LewisVs: Problem: If I am part of countless different modal continuants, which am I then myself? - Solution/Lewis: (see below E.g. Methuselah): instead of identity we take the common sharing of states - then there is only one individual - modal continuants/Problem: everything that could have happened does happen- E.g. Humphrey/Kripke: Humphrey thinks: "I could have won" - i.e.: - I am an mC with a world state that wins - i.e. the mC of which a world state is thinking these thoughts has a (different) world state that wins - LewisVs: Humphrey thinks only of himself, so it is pointless to assume that he was "part of the same mereological sum as the winner".
Counterpart theory/Lewis: according to it, Humphrey himself has properties such that he has potential winners as counterparts - substitute world: are those in which the same Humphrey just lived a different story.
Person state/continuant/Lewis: a state is not a permanent person - e.g. a person with a desire is a state - (person state, person-state).
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989
Konventionen Berlin 1975
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991