Dictionary of Arguments

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Continuants: temporally extended entities as opposed to events or occurrences. There is a debate about whether continuants themselves can have temporal parts. See also endurantism, perdurantism, ontology, person, four-dimensionalism.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
III 176 ff
Continuant/Chisholm/Simons: E.g. people, trees, cars, water waves: precisely not mereologically constant - subject to flow of their parts - most parts not necessary - no mereological essentialism - Solution: Ens Sukzessivum/E.S.: not itself permanent, itself constituted from continuants E.g. E.S.: President of the United States - (Simons: ontologically dubious) - E.S. modally analogous to non-negative situations.
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Chisholm II M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986

II 178
Problem: they must not have any negative parts.
II 179
Solution: by adding parts an object can stop to exist. E.g. egg in fertilization.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm II
Roderick Chisholm

In
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-03-23
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