|Continuants: temporally extended entities as opposed to events or occurrences. There is a debate about whether continuants themselves can have temporal parts. See also endurantism, perdurantism, ontology, person, four-dimensionalism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|III 176 ff
Continuant/Chisholm/Simons: E.g. people, trees, cars, water waves: precisely not mereologically constant - subject to flow of their parts - most parts not necessary - no mereological essentialism - Solution: Ens Sukzessivum/E.S.: not itself permanent, itself constituted from continuants E.g. E.S.: President of the United States - (Simons: ontologically dubious) - E.S. modally analogous to non-negative situations.
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Chisholm II M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986
Problem: they must not have any negative parts.
Solution: by adding parts an object can stop to exist. E.g. egg in fertilization._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004