Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Continuants: temporally extended entities as opposed to events or occurrences. There is a debate about whether continuants themselves can have temporal parts. See also endurantism, perdurantism, ontology, person, four-dimensionalism.
 
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III 176 ff
Continuant/Chisholm/Simons: E.g. people, trees, cars, water waves: precisely not mereologically constant - subject to flow of their parts - most parts not necessary - no mereological essentialism - Solution: Ens Sukzessivum/E.S.: not itself permanent, itself constituted from continuants E.g. E.S.: President of the United States - (Simons: ontologically dubious) - E.S. modally analogous to non-negative situations.
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Chisholm II M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986

II 178
Problem: they must not have any negative parts.
II 179
Solution: by adding parts an object can stop to exist. E.g. egg in fertilization.

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004


> Counter arguments against Chisholm
> Counter arguments in relation to Continuants



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-26