Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Chance: Chance refers to the possibility of an event occurring, often expressed as a probability. - Likelihood pertains to the probability of a specific outcome given certain conditions, indicating the plausibility of that outcome within a given context. Also see Likelihood, Probability._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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D.M. Armstrong on Chance - Dictionary of Arguments
III 32 Def Chance/Armstrong: = probability to t. Ojective chance: property of having a certain chance (higher-level property). Ramsey/Mellor pro, Ramsey/MellorVsArmstrong: VsLaws of Nature as relation between universals. ArmstrongVsVs: "objective chances" are ontologically questionable, universals avoid it. >Natural Laws/Armstrong, >Universals/Armstrong, >Laws/Armstrong. III 34 Chance: logical possibility in re (instead determinist law: necessarily de re). - These forces must be understood as bare powers: their nature seems to exhaust itself in their manifestation. I.e. they cannot be understood a posteriori as the result of an empirical study, as a categorical structure S._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19