Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Cartesianism: (goes back to René Descartes) the thesis that we must distinguish between extended entities (bodies, matter, res extensa) and unextended entities (spirit, soul). See also Dualism.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

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VI 165
Spirit/DavidsonVsCartesianism/Rorty: should contain a final source of evidence whose nature can be specified completely, without referring to that for which they are evidence! This mind should know its own content without knowing anything else in the world. Then the mind would be its own residence, freedom of movement independent of the environment. (Husserl, et al?). (DavidsonVs, RortyVs). But no one would assert that the brain was its own residence!
Brain/Brains in a Vat/BIV/Davidson/Rorty: the brain cannot lose contact with the outside world. It is irrelevant if it is a brain in a vat! This is also true for the mind: it must always be connected to something. That cannot be negated by a mentalist re-description.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

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> Counter arguments in relation to Cartesianism

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-11-22