Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Carnap-sentence: The Carnap-sentence, proposed by philosopher Rudolf Carnap, is a semantical sentence that serves to define the meaning of a given term within a particular language. It illustrates the logical structure of a concept through its syntactic representation._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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D. Lewis on Carnap-Sentence - Dictionary of Arguments
I (b) 29 Carnap Sentence/Carnap conditional/Lewis: states that in case of realization of the theory T the theoretical terms name the elements of a realization of T: (Note: Carnap has cases in mind where the A terms belong to an observation language). E.g. T(x)>T(t) - Ramsey sentence: has the same content as the theory in traditional terminology. --- Schwarz I 220 Theory/Lewis/Schwarz: in order to refute the Carnap conditional one would have to find that there are things that fulfil the theory, but that these are not electrons - this cannot turn out to be true - e.g. that it was not Homer who wrote the Odyssey, but another Greek man of the same name - ((s) yes, but not: "not the author of the Iliad") - no discovery about DNA, causal chains, prototypes or usage may rebut the Carnap conditional - but Carnap conditional is not suitable for definitions, because it specifies only sufficient conditions. Cf. >Ramsey sentence._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
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> Counter arguments against Lewis
> Counter arguments in relation to Carnap-Sentence
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18