|Bridge laws: provide relations between the terms of two theories, if one of the theories is to be reduced to the other. See also reduction, reductionism, theories._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
CartwrightVsBridge Laws: this is too simple a view of how explanations work; we must first provide a description of the situation before we can figure out the mathematical requirements of the theory.
Bridge Principles/BP/Cartwright: Tradition (Hempel, Grünbaum, Ernest Nagel): the propositions of a theory consist of two types: a) internal principles: content of the theory, laws about the behavior of the objects - b) bridge principles: connect the theory with more accessible aspects of reality (> "prepared description") - early: connection with monitoring reports - Vs: that does not work because of the theory ladenness of the observation new: connection of the the theory with already understood vocabulary - Hempel/late: (1979) this kind of explanation is not really deductive - HempelVsBridge-Principles: Problem: not invariably valid.
BP: saying which equations are to be chosen - (how we get into the mathematical language and out of it again).
CartwrightVsBridge Principles: instead of it we need insights on which operator is the right one for each problem. ((s) Operators/Cartwright/(s): represent the energies that are relevant in a situation within the equations.)
_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983
A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994
Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954