|Denotation, naming: specify a word or phrase for an object. Related terms description designation._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Bertrand Russell on Denotation - Dictionary of Arguments
Hintikka I 165
On Denoting/Russell/Hintikka: (Russell 1905) Problem: with phrases that stand for real constituents of propositions.
Problem/Frege: failure of the substitutability of the identity (SI) in intensional contexts.
Informative identity/Frege: that identity can sometimes be informative at all is related to this.
EG/existential generalization/Russell: it, too, can fail in intensional contexts, (problem of empty terms).
HintikkaVsRussell: he does not recognize the depth of the problem and rather avoids the problems with denotating terms.
The present King/Russell: Problem: we cannot prove by existential generalization that there is a present king of France.
HintikkaVsRussell: but there are other problems. (See below: because of the ambiguity of the cross-world identification).
Hintikka I 173
Denotation/Russell/Hintikka: N.B.: a brilliant feature of Russell's theory of the denotation from 1905 is that it is the quantifiers who denote!
Theory of Description/Russell: (end of "On Denoting") Thesis: contains the reduction of descriptions on objects of acquaintance.
Hintikka: this connection is astonishing. It also appears to be circular, only to admit objects of acquaintance.
Solution: we must see what successfully denotating phrases actually denote: they denote objects of acquaintance.
Ambiguity/uniqueness/Hintikka: it is precisely ambiguity that leads to the failure of the existential generalization.
E.g. Waverley/Russell/Hintikka: that only objects of acquaintance are allowed, shows its own example: "the author of Waverley" in (1) is actually a primary event, i.e. his example (2).
"Whether"/Russell/Hintikka: only difference: wanted to know "whether" instead of "did not know".
Secondary Description/Russell: can also be expressed in the way that George wanted to know from the man who actually wrote Waverley whether he was Scott.
That would be the case if George IV had seen Scott (at a distance) and asked "Is that Scott?".
HintikkaVsRussell: why does Russell choose an example with a perceptually known individual? Do we not normally deal with individuals of flesh and blood, whose identity is known to us, rather than merely with perceptual objects?
Knowledge who/knowledge what/perception object/Russell/Hintikka: precisely in the case of perception objects, it seems as if the kind of uniqueness that we need for a knowledge-who does not exist._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996
Merrill B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989