Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Denotation, naming: specify a word or phrase for an object. Related terms description designation._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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W.V.O. Quine on Denotation - Dictionary of Arguments
I 257 Indefinite terms do not denote objects. An indefinite singular term must therefore be in a purely denoting position: E.g. "The tax auditor is looking for someone" (the position is denoting - "someone" is not denoting). "Purely denoting" unambiguous (substitutability of identity) is not: "Tullius was a Roman" is trochaic - E.g. Tax auditor is looking for the director: -> propositional attitudes. Expression in quotation marks is not purely denoting. It has an ambiguous reference. Every truth function is transparent for denotation. Words denote, sentences do not denote (no singular term). Nevertheless, a sentence has a meaning: the singular term formed by bracketing of the sentence (this is no proposition). A proposition here is: completion of correct sentence to a timeless one. A timeless sentence is "The door is open": which door? This does not denote anything. I 413f Object: that what is denoted by singular terms, names and accepted as values. (But singular term is eliminated!) - E.g. "glimmer", but not "glimmeriness". II 61 ff Naming: is a name or singular term. Denoting: is to predict - both are referencing, not meaning various descriptions can name the same thing but have a different meaning. VII (a) 10ff Singular Term/Quine: a singular term must not denote. It has a gap between meaning and denotation. VII (c) 48ff Singular Terms/Quine: singular terms designate ("name"). >Singular Terms/Quine. A general term: means (denotes). - (> Descriptions). VII (h) 140 Purely denoting position/Quine: E.g. "Giorgione was called so because of his size". "So" is not purely denoting. Correct would be: "Giorgione was called Giorgione because...". This is then usable: "Barbarelli was called Giorgione because...". Missing substitutability signals is not a purely denoting position. One might say: The following incidents were non-denoting: "9" and "Evening Star" or "number of planets" in (15) - (17) but it is not about that. The point is that the substitution makes true statements false._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |