|Denotation, naming: specify a word or phrase for an object. Related terms description designation._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Denoting/Frege: Thesis: Complete sentences denote - ((s) i.e. Sentences with unicorns are always wrong according to Frege - Kripke: Non-denotating forms: e.g. xy: a form, e.g.(Sx)xys: is implied by each of its instances: f1 > y, f2 ↔ y, f2> y, f1 and y, etc. - These are not even significant units - this is something other than transparency.
If the terms of the object language are denoting, the meta language must include referential quantification.
Denoting/Denotation/Kripke: Problem: if some terms denote and others do not, then they are not held apart by Q(t,a): Example (26c) Q(Zeus,Zeus) is just as true - ((s) Although Zeus denotes nothing.)
(19)(Px1)(E1a)(Q(x1,a1) and term(a1)) must therefore not be construed as referential and be read as everything is denoted by a term. Wallace makes this error: Everything has a name, which he uses to show triumphantly that the substitutional quantification collapses to referential quantification. (KripkeVsWallace). Q(Cicero,Tullius) is incorrect.
Name/Denote/KripkeVsWallace: not everything needs to have a name - not every term denotes -(>Frege: each sentence is denoting: ((s) all sentences with unicorns are false or without truth value)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell, Oxford 1976
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984