|Denotation, naming: specify a word or phrase for an object. Related terms description designation._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Primitive denotation/Field: a theory T1, based on primitive denotation, has compositionality - i.e. that the truth values of the sentences depend on the truth values of the non-logical parts. - Primitive Denotation: Problem: E.g. - "He takes drugs": here only one token has a meaning, but not the type. - ((s) Primitive denotation/(s): without descriptions).
T1/Field: with primitive denotation; each name denotes what it denotes, a predicate denotes what it applies to, etc. - No composite expression has a primitive denotation.
Def truth/primitive denotation: when a speaker says something true - hence tokens! - Not types of expressions - expressions like "John", "I", "You" are always only tokens.
Advantage: diachronic theory of language.
T1 uses semantic terms: "satisfy", "denote", "apply" (unlike Tarski).
VsT1: "John", "I" or "You" - problems with expressions like T2: without semantic expressions (E.g. satisfy, denotate, apply).
Denotation/T-Theory/Language/Field: for different languages at the same time: one could define "denote": E.g. E (English) to say the name N denotes an object a is the same as to demand that either a is France and N is "France" or "a" is Germany and "N" is "Germany" ... then for another language, e.g. German: corresponding "... a is France and N is "France"...".
Problem: So one could define magic physically acceptable by simply setting up a list of magician -object pairs.
Names/Denotation/FieldVsTarski: Tarski's definition boils down to mere lists - and also lists for applying predicates and for fulfillment. - (> Possible world semantics/Field, >Properties/Field: > II 41)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994