Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Consciousness, philosophy: The experience of differences along with a knowledge about alternatives as opposed to purely automatic responses. See also intentionality, identity theory, other minds.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
I 103
Consciousness/Block: a zombie can have consciousness - SearleVs: states of consciousness always have content - but the "of" is not always one of intentionality: e.g. not in case of pain, because it is not outside.
I 112
Consciousness does not need to be naturalized, it is completely natural.
I 124f
Consciousness/McGinn: is a kind of substance - the substance itself is recognized by introspection - but we cannot recognize the connection in principle - SearleVsMcGinn: 1) Consciousness is not a substance, but a feature of the brain - 2) Consciousness is not recognized by introspection.
I 149
Space/Time/Consciousness: Asymmetry: consciousness is temporal, but not spatial (Kant, Searle).
I 153f
Fulfillment Conditions/Searle: properties of the objects are fulfillment conditions of my experiences, therefore difficult to distinguish from the property of the experiences (these always in perspective) -Consciousness reflects the fulfillment conditions. Consciousness is not always intentional: e.g. depression.
I 168 ff
Consciousness/Searle: has nothing to do with incorrigibility and introspection - Self-deception requires Cartesian dualism.
I 198 ff
Background: Skills and abilities that allow the consciousness to function (e.g. understanding pictures (uphill/downhill?) - the same real meaning determines different fulfillment conditions in different backgrounds - background: is not itself intention, "to be assumed" not explicit propositional content, not explicit belief (objects are fixed) - Network: additional knowledge (cannot interpret itself) network intentional, no ability (even during sleep) ("Bush is Predsident").

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

> Counter arguments against Searle

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-09-21