Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Consciousness, philosophy: consciousness ist the experience of differences along with a knowledge about alternatives as opposed to purely automatic responses. See also Intentionality, Identity theory, Other minds, Self-consciousness._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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G. Ryle on Consciousness - Dictionary of Arguments
I 182 Consciousness/Ryle: consciousness is not attention (regress). >Awareness, >Regress. There is no difference in having and noting. Attention is also not an inspection and neither theorizing. >Introspection. Attention: attention is not there to draw conclusions. There is no second act; it is unobservable. I 236ff Attention/consciousness/RyleVsTradition/Ryle: attention is not permanent recollection. RyleVsPhosphorescence Theory: no internal plan is presupposed, to be willing to take the next step. Not-having-forgotten: is not memory. >Memory. I 241 To be up to date: is not a 2nd order action. Self-awareness/consciousness/other minds: just as one knows from oneself, one can know of others, too. >Other minds, >First Person, cf. >Incorrigibility. _____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |