Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Consciousness, philosophy: The experience of differences along with a knowledge about alternatives as opposed to purely automatic responses. See also intentionality, identity theory, other minds.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
 
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Rorty VI 161
Consciousness/Dennett: it is an illusion to believe that consciousness is the exception to the rule that everything can be explained by its relations to other things. It is no exception.
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Dennett I 534
Consciousness/DennettVsMcGinn: apart from problems that cannot be solved in the lifetime of the universe, our consciousness will develop in a way that we cannot even imagine today.
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Dennett II 23ff
Language/animal/Consciousness/Dennett: since there is no limit to consciousness (with or without speech), since it has gradually emerged, the question of which animals have consciousness is undecidable - "a matter of style" - consciousness is not the same as thinking! Dennett: no thought without language but consciousness without thinking.
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Metzinger/Rosenthal II 430
Consciousness/Dennett: not even for the first person it is always clear what is conscious and what is not - e.g. becoming aware of the inventory of a room - E.g. wallpaper pattern: Completion by judgment, is not sensory!
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Metzinger II 475
Consciousness/Dennett: consciousness is like a simulation of the world - it relates to the brain as flight simulations relate to the processes in the computer.
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Metzinger II 555
Consciousness/Dennett: 1) cultural construction - 2) you cannot have consciousness without having the concept of consciousness - BlockVsDennett: Incorrect fusion of P-B and Z-B. (phenenmenal conscious and access-conscious).
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Chalmers I 113
Consciousness/Cognition/Dennett/Chalmers: Dennett (1978c) brings a cognitive model of consciousness consisting of the perception module, short-term memory, memory,...
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I 114
...control unit and module for "public relations": for implementation in everyday language.
ChalmersVsDennett: that shows us something about information processing and the possibility to report about it, but not why there should be a way for such a model "how it is" to be this model.
Later, Dennett introduced a more elaborate model (Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 1991) without a central "headquarter".
ChalmersVsDennett: this also brings a possible explanation of attention, but not a better explanation of conscious experience.
Consciousness/DennettVsNagel/DennettVsChalmers: thesis: what he shows, is nevertheless everything it takes to explain consciousness. As soon as one has explained the various functions, one has explained everything (Dennett, 1993a, p.210) and (FN9/Chapter 3)
Cognitive Models/Chalmers: these models also exist by Churchland (1995), Johnson-Laird (1988), Shallice (1972, 1988a, 1988b). ChalmersVs: to all, my criticism VsDennett from above applies.
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Chalmers I, 229
Consciousness/Dennett/Chalmers: (Dennett 1993b) Consciousness is what stands out in brain processes. ("Cerebral celebrity"). Such content is conscious that fix resources themselves and monopolize them. (P. 929).
Chalmers: that is close to my approach, only that I speak of potential standing out, it must only be possible that a content can play this role.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Metz I
Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.)
Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996

Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-06-24