Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

Home Screenshot Tabelle Begriffe

Domain: In model theory a set of defined objects, for which a model is satisfiable. In logic a set of objects that can be related to statements.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data

Saul A. Kripke on Domains - Dictionary of Arguments

III 372
Domain/range/Russell/Kripke: "iff" is extensional: it moves the domain inside. De dicto: de dicto always has the smallest domain: e.g. Jones believes there is ... . Dramatic difference to referential quantification: is referential quantification always the largest domain? E.g. there is something that Jones believes.
III 216f
Domain/KripkeVsRussell: he wanted to explain the difference de re/de dicto by domains: smallest domain: the smalles domain is de dicto - the largest domain is de re. KripkeVs: there are three domains: narrowest MN(Ex) (there are exactly x planets and x is even), (de dicto); largest: (e.g.) (there are exactly x planets and MN(x is even)), (de re); medium domain: M(Ex) (there are exactly x planets and N(x is even)). ((s) It is possible that there are 8 planets and it is necessary that 8 is even (correct)). ((s) Short domain: both operators are at front. Widest domain: both are in the rear. Medium domain: has distributed operators. Medium domains are possible, when operators are repeated).
III 217
Domain/Russell/Kripke: e.g. largest domain/de re: "there is a high official, so that Hoover believes that the Barrigans want to kidnap him". The smallest domain/de-dicto: "Hoover believes that the Barrigans ...". Medium domain: "Hoover believes that there is a high official, so ...".
II 217ff
Domain/Kripke: a domain is not suitable for illustrating the difference de re/de dicto because of the third domain.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell, Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984

Send Link
> Counter arguments against Kripke

Authors A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Y   Z  

Concepts A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  

Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2021-06-20
Legal Notice   Contact   Data protection declaration