|Domain: In model theory a set of defined objects, for which a model is satisfiable. In logic a set of objects that can be related to statements._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Domain/Range/Russell/Kripke: "iff" extensional: Moves domain inside - de dicto: always the smallest range: E.g. Jones believes there is ... - dramatic difference to referential quantification: is referential quantification always the largest domain? E.g. there is something that Jones believes.
Domain/KripkeVsRussell: he wanted to explain the difference de re/de dicto by domains: smallest domain: de dicto - largest domain: de re - KripkeVs: there are three areas: narrowest MN(Ex) (There are exactly x planets and x is even), (de dicto) - largest: (E.g.) (There are exactly x planets and MN(x is even)), (de re) - medium domain: M(Ex) (there are exactly x planets and N(x is even)). ((s) it is possible that there are 8 planets and it is necessary that 8 is even (correct)) - ((s) short range: both operators at front - widest: both in the rear - medium: distributed operators - medium ranges are possible, when operators are repeated).
Domain/Russell/Kripke: E.g. largest domain/de re: "there is a high official, so that Hoover believes that the Barrigans want to kidnap him" - the smallest domain/de-dicto "Hoover believes that the Barrigans ..." - medium domain "Hoover believes that there is a high official, so ...".
Domain/Kripke: not suitable for illustrating the difference de re/de dicto because of the third domain._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell, Oxford 1976
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984