|Behaviorism: presupposes observable and observed behavior and derives predictions of further behavior from them. As few assumptions as possible about a mental inner life are used for explanation. See also mentalism, behavior, consciousness._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
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Behaviorism/Tugendhat: similarity only identifiable by behavior (also for oneself) - does without notions - hence also without similarity - Behaviorism: no (abstract) concepts - Introspection: non-sensual notion of similarity, abstract concepts (conceptualism) (BehaviorismVs) - VsIntrospection: does not find concepts either, merely postulates them.
Language/Behaviorism/Tugendhat: purpose fundamental, pure signal language, circumstances important (TugendhatVsCircumstances) - "conditional rules": Use according to the circumstances, TugendhatVs - Behaviorism: no place for declarative sentences._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992