Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Assertibility: in certain circumstances or in a historical situation the possibility to make a statement when the linguistic means are given.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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I 26ff
It is not the case that P is T iff. it is not the case that P is T.
This is not valid for justified assertibility from right to left. Assertibility is naturally weaker.
I 26
Justified Assertibility/Negation: Ignorance: P is not justifiably assertible, but neither is its negation.
Truth/Ignorance: something may very well be true, even though nothing is known about it.
Truth/Justified Assertibility: E.g. snow is white: the decision about truth and assertibility may diverge here.
I 51 Deflationism: true only means of affirmation, therefore not a standard different from assertibility.
A statement can be justified without being true and vice versa.
Field II 120
Assertibility/Wright/Putnam: is the only substantial property. - Because truth is not a property. - Field: both do go next to each other, because they diverge - truth goes deeper.
Wright I 35 Justified Assertibility/Assertibility/Negation: E.g. it is not the case that P is T iff. it is not the case that P is T - This is not valid for justified assertibility from right to left - in case of ignorance, the negation is not assertible either.
I 52 ~~
Truth: timeless - justified assertibility: not timeless.
I 68 ~
Def Super-Assertibility: a statement is super-assertible if it is justified or can be justified and if its justification survived both any scrutiny of its descent and arbitrarily extensive additions and improvements to the information. - Ideal Circumstances/Putnam: timeless - Super-A no external standard, but our own practice - metaphysically neutral.
I 81 ~
Super-Assertibility/Wright: Thesis: comic and moral truths can be considered as varieties of super-assertibility. - (s) Because everything we can learn in the future comes from our own practice, we are immune to fundamental surprises.
I 102f ~
Super-Assertibility/Wright: suitable for discourses whose standards are made by us: moral, humor.
I 115 ~~
Super-Assertibility/Field/Mackie: the T predicates for mathematics or morality cannot be interpreted in terms of the S-A. - Therefore, the super-assertible need not be true in discourse. - The difference S-A/truth goes back to this.

Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-24