Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Assertibility: in certain circumstances or in a historical situation the possibility to make a statement when the linguistic means are given.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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Rorty I 307
Justified Assertibility/Putnam: (according to Rorty): if you retreat to that, you may say that e.g. "X is gold" can be justifiably asserted at Archimedes' times, and is no longer justifiably assertible today. But he would have to dismiss the statement that X was in the extension of gold, just like the statement that "X is Gold" was true, as meaningless. (>de re/de dicto).
Putnam: (according to Rorty): Follows 3 trains of thought:
1) Against the construction of 'true' as meaning the same as "justified assertibility" (or any other "soft" concept that had to do with justification). This is to show that only a theory of the relationship between words and the world can provide a satisfactory meaning of the concept of truth.
2) A certain kind of sociological facts requires an explanation: the reliability of the normal methods of scientific research, the usefulness of our language as a means, and that these facts can only be explained on the basis of realism.
3) Only the realist can avoid the conclusion from "many of the terms of the past did not refer" to "it is highly probable that none of the terms that are used today refers ".
Wright: Truth/Justified Assertibility/Putnam: (Reason, Truth and History): PutnamVs equating truth and assertibility ("rational acceptability"), but for other reasons:
 1) Truth is timeless, assertibility is not.
 2) Truth is an idealization of rational acceptability.
 E.g. idealization: not to achieve friction-free surfaces, but talking about them pays off, because we come very close to them.
VI 30
Rorty: "justified assertibility" (pragmatism, Dewey) PutnamVs: "naturalistic fallacy": a given belief can satisfy all such conditions and still be wrong. PutnamVsRorty et al.: ignore the need to admit the existence of "real directedness" or "intentionality".
Putnam: an "ideal audience" (before which a justification is sufficient) cannot exist. A better audience can always be assumed.
Putnam I 96
Ideal Assertibility/PutnamVsPeirce: no "ideal limit" can be specified sensibly - not to specify any conditions for science - PutnamVsKuhn. if you do not believe in convergence, but in revolutions, you should interpret the connectors intuitionistically and understand truth intra-theoretically.
I 141
Truth/Assertibility/Tarski/Putnam: from his truth-definition also follows assertibility - the probability of a sentence in the meta-language is equivalent to that in the object language.
I 246
Truth/Justified Assertibility/Kripke's Wittgenstein: that would only be a matter of general agreement - PutnamVsKripke: that would be a wrong description of the concepts that we actually have - and a self-contradictory attempt at taking an "absolute perspective".

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-25