Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Conceptual scheme: language and assumed objects. - The content is provided by stimulus influences.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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Richard Rorty
Horwich I 454
Conceptual scheme/DavidsonVscorrespondence/Rorty: we get rid of all these intermediate elements together with the correspondence - e.g. CS, "perspective", language, culture, "point of view", - "tertia" - this intentionalist terms are the sources of skepticism.
Horwich I 454
Scheme/content/conceptual scheme/DavidsonVsScepticism/Rorty: the dualism scheme/content: possible forms: "conceptual frame", "intended interpretation": these are not causally linked to the things they organize - they vary independently of the rest of the universe - without them we look at our own beliefs as in the RI -
Horwich I 454
RI/conceptual scheme/Davidson/Rorty: examining ourselves with the RI makes a correspondence relation, "intended beliefs" etc. superfluous -
Rorty I 300
Conceptual scheme/3rd dogma/ Rorty: as soon as conceptual schemes became something transitory, the distinction between scheme and content itself was in at risk - then science does not become possible through an a priori contribution of our knowledge.
I 330
Conceptual scheme/Davidson/Rorty: talk of the scheme or conceptual system attempts to separate the concept of truth from the concept of meaning and therefore has to fail - then there would have to be an "alternative CS" that would be true, but untranslatable - that is incomprehensible - I 338 Rorty: there is no neutral basis from which various schemes can be compared -" nor do we have the right to assume a common scheme - solution: without 3rd Dogma (scheme/content) we restore the direct reference to the objects.
VI 64
Conceptual schemes/point of view/Putnam/Rorty we must always use a specific system of concepts (we cannot do otherwise) - but we must not claim that this is actually not the way in which things behave.
VI 127
Conceptual scheme/DavidsonVs3rd Dogma/Rorty: we must stop sorting statements by whether they are "made" true by "the world" or by "us" - DavidsonVsVs conceptual scheme/DavidsonVsQuine
VI 129
Conceptual scheme/content/Rorty: the distinction is not to be confused with the distinction "is"/"seems to be" - VI 135 we can not specify which "moves" of nature belong to the scheme and which belong to content.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-24