|Conceptual scheme: language and assumed objects. - The content is provided by stimulus influences.|
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|Horwich I 454
Conceptual scheme/DavidsonVscorrespondence/Rorty: we get rid of all these intermediate elements together with the correspondence - e.g. CS, "perspective", language, culture, "point of view", - "tertia" - this intentionalist terms are the sources of skepticism.
Horwich I 454
Scheme/content/conceptual scheme/DavidsonVsScepticism/Rorty: the dualism scheme/content: possible forms: "conceptual frame", "intended interpretation": these are not causally linked to the things they organize - they vary independently of the rest of the universe - without them we look at our own beliefs as in the RI -
Horwich I 454
RI/conceptual scheme/Davidson/Rorty: examining ourselves with the RI makes a correspondence relation, "intended beliefs" etc. superfluous -
Rorty I 300
Conceptual scheme/3rd dogma/ Rorty: as soon as conceptual schemes became something transitory, the distinction between scheme and content itself was in at risk - then science does not become possible through an a priori contribution of our knowledge.
Conceptual scheme/Davidson/Rorty: talk of the scheme or conceptual system attempts to separate the concept of truth from the concept of meaning and therefore has to fail - then there would have to be an "alternative CS" that would be true, but untranslatable - that is incomprehensible - I 338 Rorty: there is no neutral basis from which various schemes can be compared -" nor do we have the right to assume a common scheme - solution: without 3rd Dogma (scheme/content) we restore the direct reference to the objects.
Conceptual schemes/point of view/Putnam/Rorty we must always use a specific system of concepts (we cannot do otherwise) - but we must not claim that this is actually not the way in which things behave.
Conceptual scheme/DavidsonVs3rd Dogma/Rorty: we must stop sorting statements by whether they are "made" true by "the world" or by "us" - DavidsonVsVs conceptual scheme/DavidsonVsQuine
Conceptual scheme/content/Rorty: the distinction is not to be confused with the distinction "is"/"seems to be" - VI 135 we can not specify which "moves" of nature belong to the scheme and which belong to content.
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994