Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Concept: term for an entity with certain properties. The properties of an object correspond to the features of the concept. These concept features are necessary in contrast to the properties of an individual object, which are always contingent.
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II 32
Concept/Logical Form/Wittgenstein: E.g. "thing", "complex", "number" are not concepts, but logical forms - Concept/Wittgenstein: can be expressed as a propositional function - Number: is a pseudo concept - must occur within the brackets - e.g. (Example number). Fx - false: (e.g.).x is a number - wrong: (e.g.).x is a thing - AF: f() = () is a human. But not: f () = () is a number!
II 34
Pseudo Concept: e.g. "color", "primary color": it draws a limit to language - Concept: e.g. red: draws a line in language.
II 39
Point: (in maths) not a concept.
II 254
Concept/Meaning/Experience/Wittgenstein: the fact that a thing corresponds to a concept is not an empirical fact - in a sense, it must always have corresponded to it - ((s) but our concepts are like rules) - ((s) therefore correspondence is not a natural fact) - On the other hand: correspondence with a pattern is an empirical fact.
II 255
Rules: do not follow from the concept, but are constitutive for it - the rules are also not included in the concept - a symbol connected to a concept is just another symbol.
IV 46
Formal Concepts/Function/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: 4,126 formal concepts - (e.g. numbers, name) - cannot be represented by a function - each variable is the sign of a formal concept.
IV 46f
Pseudo Concept/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: e.g. object - the variable name x is its real sign - correct use: "(e.g.) ..." - otherwise pseudo-sentences are formed - Pseudo-sentence: -there are objects- correct sentence: e.g. -there are books - Pseudo-sentence: to speak of the number of all objects.

L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-24