Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Concept: term for an entity with certain properties. The properties of an object correspond to the features of the concept. These concept features are necessary in contrast to the properties of an individual object, which are always contingent.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
I 76
Concept/experience: it is not true that we have the concept of something because we recognize that sort of thing. It is rather the reverse: the ability to recognize a type of something, presupposes that one already has the concept of this type. We may not have the impression of a tree, if we do not have the concept of the tree.
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II 308
Concept: A conceptual object will become what it is, only by the difference that was caused by its presence in at least some inferences. This is a familiar theme in contemporary philosophy. > Inferentialism/Brandom, inferential content/Brandom, inference/Brandom.
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Field II 166
Term/Schiffer: is only the shadow of subsentential expressions.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Sellars I
Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
German Edition:
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sellars II
Wilfred Sellars
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-08-19
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