Dictionary of Arguments

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Concept: term for an entity with certain properties. The properties of an object correspond to the features of the concept. These concept features are necessary in contrast to the properties of an individual object, which are always contingent.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
VI 392
Concepts/Ockham/Putnam: could be mental particulars. - I.e. if characters are particulars as "signs", then any concept we have of the relation between sign and object is another sign. - PutnamVsOckham: Problem: this relation cannot be unambiguously identified by holding up a sign with COW - or another sign, with REFERS.
VI 393
On the other hand: if concepts are not particulars, there may be uses of signs (if they are "in the head") - (Putnam pro). - But: Problem: the use does not clearly single out a relation between the concepts and "real objects". - ((s) "Concept": Here "way of using characters") - If concepts are neither particulars (signs) nor ways of use, only the mysterious "grasping of forms" remains.
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Putnam V 40ff
Concepts/Putnam: cannot be identical to inner notions, because concepts are public - they are (partially) skills, not incidents.
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I (b) 63
Cluster Concept/Putnam: E.g."human" as a list of properties - PutnamVs: the speaker does not need to have any knowledge of the laws that rule the electrons. - Even if reference was "socially" determined, this cannot correspond to what "every speaker implicitly means".
- - -
I (g) 190
Concept/Possible World/Putnam: modern semantics: functions about possible worlds represent concepts - e.g. the term "this statue" is not equal to the term "this piece of clay". - PutnamVsPossible Worlds: Question: is there in the real world (the actual world) an object to which one of these concepts applies essentially and the other one only accidentally? - Possible Worlds deliver too many objects. PutnamVsKripke:/PutnamVsEssentialism: Kripke's ontology presupposes essentialism, it cannot justify it. - Modal properties are not part of the materialistic equipment of the world. - But Kripke individuates objects by their modal properties. - Essential Characteristics/Putnam: I have not shifted them to "parallel worlds" but rather to possible states of the real world - (e.g. a liquid other than H20 is water). - This is essentialist in as far as it allowed us to discover the nature of water. - We just say water should be nothing else (intention). - That's simply our use and not "built into the world" (intrinsic) - (Kripke ditto). - VsMaterialism: this semantic interpretation does not help him, because it already presupposes reference. - (Materialism wants to gain reference from "intrinsic" causal relationship).


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf, Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000


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