Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Meaning change/semantic change: this is about the question whether the meaning of the terms of a theory change in the light of new knowledge. If they do, problems with incommensurability may arise. See also reference, incommensurability, progress, comparisons.
 
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Rorty I 300
Meaning Change/Putnam/Rorty: The search for a criterion for the semantic change was disastrous. It was recognized that Feyerabend had put his own argument forward wrongly when he spoke of meaning change.
PutnamVsFeyerabend: for Feyerabend the meaning depends on the whole theory. Assuming the empiricism changes the meaning of the term, that would equal the task of distinguishing between meaning questions and questions of fact.
  To say that the semantic rules of German cannot be distinguished from the empirical opinions of its speakers, would mean to throw the notion of a semantic rule of German overboard.
  Each appearance of a sensation would have disappeared because "Sensation" depends on the fact that you are constantly moving back and forth between an unusual and the traditional conception of meaning.
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Putnam I 63
Theory/Putnam: two theories do not have to have equivalent terms, but only the same reference.
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Cavell I 268
Comprehensibility/Putnam: before Riemann the corresponding terms were incomprehensible. For example, the geometry of the universe is dependent on mass density.
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I 269
Meaning Change/Putnam: if we get said that straight lines can behave in a non-Euclidean way, then, according to the idea, the old grammar is not contradicted; it is simply abandoned. Yes, the concept of the straight line has been changed.
Putnam: That may be. But his denotation has not changed. Anyone who aligns these cases to cases where the denotation changes is completely wrong. ((s) Denotation equals here reference, designation, description?)
Definition Denotation/Duden: (a) the meaning which refers to the object: (moon: earthtrabant)
(b) the formal relationship between sign and signified.
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I 270
Putnam: then one would ask: what are then the straight lines in the old sense?
If scientific revolution meant a new definition of terms, or if we always had to change our criteria, then we could not speak of the same objects!
Projection of old concepts into new situations is also necessary to understand metaphors and jokes.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Cav I
St. Cavell
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-25