|Meaning change/semantic change: this is about the question whether the meaning of the terms of a theory change in the light of new knowledge. If they do, problems with incommensurability may arise. See also reference, incommensurability, progress, comparisons._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.|
Books on Amazon
|Rorty I 291
Meaning change/DavidsonVsPutnam/Rorty: the concept itself is already incoherent.
Rorty IV 23
Davidson/Rorty: every sentence ever used at all refers to the world of which we now believe exists (such as the world of electrons and the like). Aristotle and Galileo must therefore be held responsible in front of the same court. Rorty: but this is not a new result, which would have been enforced by Kripke, for example, it is simply trivial.
Rorty V 18
DavidsonVsIncommensurability: if that means "expressions that are used in other cultures cannot be equated with our expressions", then this thesis refutes itself. - Putnam: there are no criteria such as "institutionalized norms" and a contrary thesis refutes itself just as the thesis of incommensurability._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000