Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Meaning change/semantic change: this is about the question whether the meaning of the terms of a theory change in the light of new knowledge. If they do, problems with incommensurability may arise. See also reference, incommensurability, progress, comparisons.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data

 
Books on Amazon
I 670
Change of concept/Change of meaning/QuineVsFeyerabend: Solution: The semantically relevant is not the meaning but the reference - what we want to represent, and not what we say about it - the extensional content is communicated - even from a Zoroastrian you can find out whether the sun is shining - inferential significances which indeed vary from one speaker to another do not matter then. Instead, there are extensions that vary from possible world to possible worlds.
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I 671
Content/Concept change/Scheffler/Boyd/Putnam: content is no longer viewed as inferential role: inference can be re-introduced at two levels: a) some inferential accuracies can be read from inclusion relations between the extensions of predicates -b) insight into the relativity of extensions against various context elements leads to a new concept of intentions: - Definition intension: functions of indices to extensions! A more robust type of content that is at best shared by the audience. (BrandomVs) - (Scheffler/Boyd/PutnamVsFeyerabend: Progress as talk of more and more objects that bring more and more predicate extensions into play) - inferential significances which indeed vary from one speaker to another do not matter - instead there are extensions that vary from possible world to possible world.
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I 671F
Inferential contents as functions/Change of concept: possible solution: ordered pairs of circumstances and consequences of the use - Advantage: It would not be necessary to always admit that the meaning of the word changes with every new belief - BrandomVs: cannot explain why one intension and not the other is now associated.
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I 673
Problem: functions can only be constructed by arguments which are beyond behavioral dispositions.
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I 673
Change of concept/Intensional theory/BrandomVs: not easy to show: e.g. that the early theorists used "electron" intensionally in a way that allowed plenty of room for our rethinking - QuineVs: reference instead of importance (see above).


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-10-21