Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Meaning: Differs from the reference object (reference). The object does not have to exist for an expression to have a meaning. Words are not related to objects in a one-to-one correspondence. There is an important distinction between word meaning and sentence meaning. See also use theory, sentence meaning, reference, truth, meaning theory._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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J.R. Searle on Meaning - Dictionary of Arguments
I 66 Naturalization of content: naturalization of content is the separation of consciousness and intentionality (SearleVs) SearleVsPutnam/Searle: meanings are in the head (> Intentionality/Searle). --- II 25 ff Meanings are in the head (VsPutnam) because perception is self-related. Perception provides self fulfilling conditions. >Putnam: Meanings are "not in the head". II 255 Meaning/Searle: meaning is in the head, fulfilling conditions are in the intentionality. Putnam: they are not in the head, conditions in the world have a crucial indexical determination; it is not the concept which fixes the meaning. Searle: meaning is not determined by ideolect. - > Elm/beech example, > Twin Earth. --- V 69 Meaning goes beyond the intention. It is usually a matter of convention. V 68 Chess/Searle: the figures usually have no meaning, and who makes a move usually means nothing. >Chess, >Chess figures/Wittgenstein. --- IV 157 Meaning/Searle: meaning depends on the context - like other non-conventional succession of forms of intentionality. >Context dependence. IV 159 Ultimately, meaning depends on our perception as a basic form of intentionlity._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |