Dictionary of Arguments

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Meaning: Differs from the reference object (reference). The object does not have to exist for an expression to have a meaning. Words are not related to objects in a one-to-one correspondence. There is an important distinction between word meaning and sentence meaning. See also use theory, sentence meaning, reference, truth.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
Davidson I 143
Quine connects meaning and content to the firing of sensory nerves ("compromise"). This is his naturalized epistemology.
(according to Rorty ): concept, meaning: Quine: only one species of intentions - And all intentions to be tilted. "Does", "believes" and "wants" have no behavioral equivalents. We do not need "opinion" and "want", neither "concept" and "intuition".
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Quine I 89f
Stimulus meaning is independent - by number of speakers - watching nearby: social: similarity of the stimulus meaning within the community - high stimulus nearness: Colors - low stimulus nearness: "Bachelor".
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I 92
Stimulus synonymy: for each speaker: "Bachelor" = "unmarried man" - but not stimulus meaning.
Gaurisankar: opportunity sentences exclude each other, after the discovery of stimulus meanings fall along.
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I 92
Meaning of "neutrino" is not language-neutral. It is not translated into native language. - A theory is forever underdetermined. - There are real cultural opposites. - Synonymy is indefinable. - Truth of scientific methods is indefinable. (Within the theory).
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I 317
Laws: in terms of importance.
That Socrates only applies to one is not so random - Law of the meaning of the general term - not from circumstances.
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II 61ff
Naming : Name or singular term - Denoting: predicate - both are reference, not meaning.
Meaning: something that can have an expression, as something external - demands various homonyms - term expression cannot assume meaning of the term - key: substitutability (in the affirmative, not absolute).
"Mean" is intransitive - with the same meaning - not a common thing - but: by assumption of "equal signifying" we can assume a meaning! (> Ontology/Quine).
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VI 74
Definition Meaning/Quine: a class of all expression meanings is the same as an expression. - Can there be a thing as a class of all things equal to a? Can you define the same things? - No, because a dog cannot be equated with the class of dogs. - Then this is just the particularity of meaning?
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VI 75
Meaning/Quine: only testable sentences have empirical content. - Problem: meaning of connectives, etc. - Solution: Substitutivity? - Not possible from language to language.
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XII 94f
Meaning/experience/holism/QuineVsPeirce: if meaning is what makes a difference to the experience, it affects the whole theories, not individual experience sentences - pro: this is then the basis of experience - falsification/QuineVsPopper: it shows only the falsity of one or more statements, but not what is false.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-03-22
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