Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Meaning: Differs from the reference object (reference). The object does not have to exist for an expression to have a meaning. Words are not related to objects in a one-to-one correspondence. There is an important distinction between word meaning and sentence meaning. See also use theory, sentence meaning, reference, truth.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
I 60
Meaning/content/validity/valid/use/use theory/Nagel: the validity of thought does not depend on how they are used.
I 61
However, the practice of the community cannot be defeated by the objectivity of the field: the language changes - for the content of thought - in contrast to the meaning of words that does not apply, however. - Meaning: is contingent. - E.g. that "and" is the word for conjunction. - Thinking content: is the conjunction. (The content of thought itself is not contingent).
I 63
NailvsUse Theory: meaning is not simply the same as use, unless one understands "use" in a normative sense, that already implies meaning.
II 34
Meaning/Definition/Nail: definitions cannot be the foundation of the meaning of each word, otherwise we would move in circles - somewhere we need to get to words that have their meaning in a direct manner.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Th. Nagel
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

Th. Nagel
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

Th. Nagel
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

> Counter arguments against Nagel
> Counter arguments in relation to Meaning

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-06-28