Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

Home Screenshot Tabelle Begriffe

 
Meaning: Differs from the reference object (reference). The object does not have to exist for an expression to have a meaning. Words are not related to objects in a one-to-one correspondence. There is an important distinction between word meaning and sentence meaning. See also use theory, sentence meaning, reference, truth, meaning theory.
_____________
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

John McDowell on Meaning - Dictionary of Arguments

I 160ff
Meaning/Quine: New: "empiricist meaning": is intellectually prestigious, because it can be explained completely by the lawful operations of the receptivity. On the other hand, the old concept of meaning stands on the wrong side of this duality. (See also >content/McDowell
).
Meaning/Quine: the joke in Quine is that meaning in the intuitive sense cannot be determined by exogenous factors.
I 184/5
McDowell: if we drop the Third Dogma (>distinction schema/content), it is not surprising that the meaning is now underdetermined by the "empiricist meaning".
I 185
McDowell: the "empiricist meaning" cannot be a real meaning anyway, since, as a counterpart to "conceptual sovereignty," it can have nothing to do with reasons and justification.
McDowellVsQuine: but that does not show that meaning is at all underdetermined. We would have to show that we have an indelible leeway if we are looking for a kind of understanding that brings us out of the field of "empiricist meaning". An understanding that shows how life phenomena are structured in the order of justification, the space of reason. This cannot be learned from Quine.
I 119
Meaning/McDowell: we must not construct it "socially-pragmatic" or "communitarian". (Wittgenstein did not do that either).
  Otherwise it is no longer autonomous. Uninhibited Platonism would be a tendency to the occult.
  Wittgenstein: has not asserted that meaning is nothing but approval or rejection by the community.
>Meaning/Kripke.
I 119
Kripke's Wittgenstein/McDowellVsKripke: comes to the conclusion that there is nothing that constitutes the receptiveness for the claim that makes the meaning to us; instead, we must understand the role of thought in our lives through our participation in the community.
I 121
Thesis: Meaning/McDowellVsDualism: Solution: second nature. The idea of education assures that the autonomy of meaning is not inhumane. This leaves no real questions about norms.
---
II XIV
Meaning/McDowell: truth theory is not sufficient for a meaning theory because of the equivalence of "snow is white" and "grass is green". - This is true, but not meaningful. - McDowell: Thesis: we need additional psychological concepts.
II XV
Problem: then the propositional settings must be as fixed as the meanings. -> Radical Interpretation.

_____________
Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell,


Send Link
> Counter arguments against McDowell
> Counter arguments in relation to Meaning

Authors A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Y   Z  


Concepts A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  



Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-16
Legal Notice   Contact   Data protection declaration