Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Meaning: Differs from the reference object (reference). The object does not have to exist for an expression to have a meaning. Words are not related to objects in a one-to-one correspondence. There is an important distinction between word meaning and sentence meaning. See also use theory, sentence meaning, reference, truth, meaning theory._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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D. Lewis on Meaning - Dictionary of Arguments
II 197 Meaning/Name/Lewis: may be a function of worlds in truth value - of generic names: function from worlds to quantities. II 213 Putnam: meanings not in the head - Lewis pro: mental state does not determine the meaning - meaning cannot be found out through mental state - mental state contains too little information about causation and situation. II 213/14 Carrier of meaning: speech acts - not sounds or characters! -> Intentionality, > meaning (intending). --- IV 194 Meaning/Lewis: Here’s a function that provides as output an appropriate extension for given combinations of factors provides as time, place, context, speaker, world - intension/Lewis: function that leads from indices (time, place, speaker, world) to appropriate extensions for a name, sentence, or general term - intensions are extension-determining functions - Carnap’s intension: provides truth value for sentences or things, for names and quantities, for general terms. IV 200 Intension/meaning/Lewis: E.g. "Snow is white or not" differs finely in the meaning of "Grass is green or not" - because of the different intensions of the embedded sentences. - (Intension: Function of indices on extensions). - Meaning/Lewis: semantically interpreted phrase markers minus the top nodes of the structure treeS - synonymy: sameness of intension. Meaning/BenacerrafVsLewis: how can you ever "choose" meaning? - Lewis: this is a general objection Vs quantity-theoretic approaches. IV 202 Definition phrase structure rules/Lewis: = semantically interpreted phrase markers - Definition meaning: a structure tree ... - we often talk about meanings as if they were symbolic expressions, although they are not - the category meaning is simply the top node - intension: is the second component of the top node. --- Schwarz I 216 Meaning/object/word/Lewis: thesis: our words are merely linked to conditions to be fulfilled by a potential reference - so it may be that something fulfills them of which we did not think beforehand that it would fulfill them. >Reference, >Words, >a posteriori._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19