Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments


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Meaning: The meaning of an expression differs from the reference object (reference). The object does not have to exist for an expression to have a meaning. Words are not related to objects in a one-to-one correspondence. There is an important distinction between word meaning and sentence meaning. See also use theory, sentence meaning, compositionality, reference, truth.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
I 28f
Frege: sense/meaning - GeachVsRussell: false equivalence with "means"/"denotes" (refers to) in Principia Mathematica - seeming parallel: a description contains "meaning" (Sinn) as a component, but not on this sense but about the objects. The description denotes.
Signifiying expression/Russell: general term with a prefix, all, some, etc.
Meaning/Principia Mathematica: two phrases mean the same thing when they maintain the same assumption - Signify/Frege: two sentences mean the same when they have both the same truth value.
Incomplete symbol/Russell/late: certain descriptions have no meaning.
GeachVs: this is misleading – rather: we do not need a single entity that corresponds to a specific description – E. g "There is a King…".

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2020-02-25
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