Dictionary of Arguments

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Meaning: Differs from the reference object (reference). The object does not have to exist for an expression to have a meaning. Words are not related to objects in a one-to-one correspondence. There is an important distinction between word meaning and sentence meaning. See also use theory, sentence meaning, reference, truth.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
Cresswell II 56
Meanings/Fodor/Cresswell: FodorVsPutnam : These: meanings are in the head. - CresswellVsFodor : problem with the ascription:I will have to have the same representation in the head - it must have the same belief as the one he has - (meanings are not representations).
IV 57
Meaning/Quine : not from speaker meaning, not acceptance of inferences of the speaker - the speaker meaning depends on the worldview, and thus of an intention what the words should mean - it can not distinguish between the views the speaker accepted a priori and those he accepted later -- so there are no analytic sentences- there is no epistemic criteria for “true by meaning”.
IV 117
meaning / truth / Davidson : a speaker holds a sentence to be true because of the meaning and because of his belief - so we can not conclude from utterance meaning if we do not know the beliefs of the speaker and we can not do it the other way around.
IV 121
Belief ascription / attribution of meaning / Davidson theory: information about the shape of the words which are held to be true are the decisive evidence for both attributions here - adoption of sincerity alone is not enough to detect meaning - we need information either about his belief - or about the meanings. - Fodor/LeporeVsLewis: then the primacy thesis is implausible - (Primacy thesis: "the conditions of intentional attribution include the conditions for belief ascription").


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-05-22
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