|Meaning: Differs from the reference object (reference). The object does not have to exist for an expression to have a meaning. Words are not related to objects in a one-to-one correspondence. There is an important distinction between word meaning and sentence meaning. See also use theory, sentence meaning, reference, truth._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Def Quasi-translation/Def quasi-meaning/FieldVsChurch/FieldVsSchiffer/Field : this is what most mean by meaning. - Not a literal translation but the use of the words by the interpreter in his own language at the time in his actual world. - Comparability is preserved even in the quasi-translation, not in a literal.
Sententialism/sententionalism/Field: Thesis: When we say someone says that snow is white, we express a relation between the person and the set of
1st quasi- translation and quasi- meaning rather than literal
2nd "La neige est blanche" quasi-means the same as #snow is white#. - ((#): What stands between #, is to be "quasi-translated".) In the quasi-translation, the quasi-meaning is obtained.
Intentional meaning/Field: it is completely empty – E.g. Suppose we wanted a theory of intentional meaning, then we also needed one of their combinations. – We also need a theory of the corresponding truth conditions. - Problem : if we set up a theory here, it is not completely trivial, that the intentional meaning of "Plato" is just Plato! - We need an extra explanation. - That would solve nothing. – It would only bring problems. – Better instead: compositional theory of expressions (not of meanings)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980