Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Barcan formula: claims that from the fact that it is possible that an object has a certain property it follows that this object exists. The formula is valid only in a few systems. See also modal logic.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
 
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Books on Amazon
HC I 128
Barcan-Formula/BF/Kripke: takes for each possible world an individual domain, giving it a semantics, where in contrast to our the Barcan formula is not valid. ( > Accessibility) - Accessibility / LewisVsKripke: with Lewis via individuals, therefore Barcan formula for Lewis is valid. -
HC I, 150f
Barcan-Formel/poss. wo./Semantik/Hughes/Cresswell : BF is invalid in semantics that assign d different domains of individuals to diff. poss. wo.. - ( > Accessibility) -
HC I, 150f
Barcan-Formula/H/C: Vs : that everything that exists is necessary f, does not exclude that there could be things (or could have been ), not-f . - Then it would not be a necessary truth that everything is f . - VsVs: this proceeds from the assumption that objects not only may have other properties in different poss. wo., but that there might even be objects that do not exist in the actual world. - (( s) making the difference in the two sides of the formula) . -> Extension of the existence predicate -> existence of difference / "there" ?
HC I 156
Barcan-Formel/Existenz/MöWe/Hughes/Cresswell: three perspectives : a) all powo have the same domain of individuals : BF then valid (which include T and S4) objects are the same, properties and relations change - b) new things arise: BF invalid in any case concerning T and S4 - c) even more liberal: objects can be removed.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984


> Counter arguments against Cresswell



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-06-23