Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Screenshot Tabelle Begriffe

Attributive/referential: difference in reference - attributive "whoever it is" (may not be identified) - referential the identified object.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data

Books on Amazon
IV 101
Attributive/Tradition/Grammar: relative expressions such as "large", "hot" - Searle: require background: all big women are similar in terms of height - Attributive/Searle: what is meant and the sentence meaning are the same thing.
IV 161
Referential/Donnellan/Searle: S talked about e, no matter if e is actually F - you can then also report with other expressions than "the F" - Attributive: here there is no entity e, the speaker would not even have had in mind that they existed - attributive: the statement can then not be true.
VI 164
Donnellan: E.g. "the winner, whoever it is": here, in the attributive sense nothing is actually talked about - referential/attributive: there is no distinction between beliefs.
IV 165ff
Referential/Attributive/SearleVsDonnellan: instead: aspects: you can choose the aspect under which you speak about an object - primary A: if nothing satisfies it, the speaker had nothing in mind (hallucination) - secondary A: any aspect for which it is true that S tried to talk with it about the object, that fulfils its primary A, without being meant to belong to the truth conditions - Champagne example even works if water is in the glass - Searle: then the statement may also be true - the meaning does not change if no other aspect could assume the role of the primary one.
VI 175
Referential/Searle: brings secondary aspect - Attributive: brings primary A.
VI 176
Both readings can be intensional and extensional.
VI 175
What is meant is decisive - Difference sentence/finding: finding is decided, sentence is not (what was said literally).

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Send Link
> Counter arguments against Searle

Authors A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  

Concepts A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  

> Suggest your own contribution | > Suggest a correction | > Export as BibTeX Datei
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-10-24