Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Attributive/referential: difference in reference - attributive "whoever it is" (may not be identified) - referential the identified object._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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J.R. Searle on Attributive/referential - Dictionary of Arguments
IV 101 Attributive/Tradition/Grammar: attributive includes relative expressions such as "large" or "hot". Searle: we require background. All tall women are similar in terms of height. Attributive/Searle: what is meant and the sentence meaning are the same thing. IV 161 Referential/Donnellan/Searle: S talked about e, no matter if e is actually F. You can then also report with other expressions than "the F". Attributive: here there is no entity e, the speaker would not even have had in mind that they existed. Attributive: the statement can then not be true. IV 164 Donnellan: E.g. "The winner, whoever it is": here, in the attributive sense nothing is actually talked about. Referential/attributive: there is no distinction between beliefs. IV 165ff Referential/Attributive/SearleVsDonnellan: instead: aspects: you can choose the aspect under which you speak about an object. Primary A: if nothing satisfies it, the speaker had nothing in mind (hallucination). Secondary A: any aspect for which it is true that S tried to talk with it about the object, that fulfils its primary A, without being meant to belong to the truth conditions. >">Truth condition, >Aspects/Searle. The Champagne example even works if water is in the glass. Searle: then the statement may also be true. The meaning does not change if no other aspect could assume the role of the primary one. IV 175 Referential/Searle: the referential brings the secondary aspect. Attributive: brings the primary aspect. IV 176 Both readings can be intensional and extensional. >Intension, >Extension. IV 175 What is meant is decisive. Difference sentence/finding: finding is decided, a sentence is not (what was said literally). >Meaning(Intending), >Intention, >Speaker intention._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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> Counter arguments against Searle
> Counter arguments in relation to Attributive/referential
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-20