Dictionary of Arguments

Screenshot Tabelle Begriffe

 
Attributive/referential: difference in reference - attributive "whoever it is" (may not be identified) - referential the identified object.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
II 209
KripkeVsDonnellan: his theory is correct, but does not refute Russell's (better, because more consistent) theory - Distinction referential/attributive has nothing to do with distinction de re/de dicto (Donnellan ditto).
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II 236f
Referential/attriutive/KripkeVsDonnellan: distinction speaker reference/semantic reference is needed anyway, it is sufficient instead of distinction referential/attributive - E.g. The real husband is irrelevant. - I do not need to have confused two people - I just believe that a person has a property that it lacks in reality.
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II 222
E.g. "her husband is kind to her"/Linsky/Kripke: Problem with the statement: is it true? The use cannot be analyzed here, only the meanings of the sentence. - In referential use it is unclear what is meant by "statement".


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell, Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-12-16
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