|Attributive/referential: difference in reference - attributive "whoever it is" (may not be identified) - referential the identified object._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Attributive Meaning/Chisholm: the property of being-F is the attributive meaning of the expression T in a language L if it is true for every object that 1) it is only designated with it if it has that property, 2) every speaker then assumes the property - I 90 Name: Important Argument: not valid for names - I 108 Annemary has no attributive meaning, therefore there is no property of "loving Annemarry."
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Chisholm II M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986
Referential/Attributive/Brandl: based on reports: only attributive - in addition, there are still the cases of "whoever it is" - according to this, both, ref and att, are based on a de-re belief - i.e. we cannot say that att only covers one area that is only possible with de-dicto use.
Attributive/Brandl: works only with de dicto-use, not if the speaker knows the object - whoever it is: "area" does not work: neither seen object nor from report - distinction ref/att is to be made within de-re statements - but we must always know what role the reference plays in the concrete case.
Referential/Donnellan/Brandl: here, the speaker must not only know what the object designated by him is, but he must also know it - only then belief de-re "of the smallest spy" possible.
Contradiction to the above: only ref. if the speaker can take from reports of others who it is about.
Referential is the basic form of every reference - BrandlVs: this is the reductionist variant.
Attributive/Brandl: here, the "directedness" of the description function depends on the expressions - (borderline case) - with that, the speaker refers to an object, because he knows that he is also the only one to fulfill another description - ( "epistemically close")._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004