Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Attributive/referential: difference in reference - attributive "whoever it is" (may not be identified) - referential the identified object.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
I 681
Attributive/Referential/Brandom: It is about the listener, not the speaker. - That is a matter of the significance which is assigned to a Tokening, not the significance based on its type. - Champagne e.g.: there must be an expression from the perspective of the listener, which the speaker might have used as well. - > de re / de dicto.
II 52/53
Verb: e.g. "to march": semantic interpretant: Function of object on possible worlds - adverb: E.g. "slow" function of (functions of objects on possible worlds) to (functions of objects on possible worlds) - then attributive: here the inference from "aF!" to "aF slow" is alright - not attributive: not alright e.g. "in someone's imagination".

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

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> Counter arguments against Brandom

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-07-21
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