Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Atomism (philosophy, logic): A) Atomism is the assumption that the facts can be represented by elementary sentences. Thus the question of the independence of facts is raised. See also Atomic sentences, Humean supervenience, Causality.
B) In relation to the world, the atomism of ancient philosophy assumes that there are smallest units, the atoms. These are sometimes thought of as having a particular shape._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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J. Fodor on Atomism - Dictionary of Arguments
IV 6ff Atomism/Fodor/Lepore: British empiricists, Russell's Analysis of Mind, Vienna Circle, Peirce, James. Today: behaviorism, information semantics and model theory all comprise the theory that the semantic properties of a symbol is determined only by a nonlinguistic world. >Behaviorism, >Reality, >Symbols. Opposite side: Vs: Frege, structuralist linguistics. Representatives: Quine, Davidson, Dennett, Lewis, Block, Devitt, Putnam, Rorty, Sellars, almost the entire AI and Cognitive Psychology. >Artificial Intelligence, >Cognitive psychology. _____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-16