Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Aspect: perspective from which an object or a problem is considered. Problematic when aspects, views, perspectives are objectified. They are not part of the object, but consist in the relation to the object._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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J.R. Searle on Aspects - Dictionary of Arguments
VI 169 Def Primary Aspect/Searle: if nothing fulfills the primary aspect, the speaker had nothing in mind (he/she just thought he/she had it), e.g. hallucination. The statement cannot be true. Def Secondary Aspect/Searle: a secondary aspect is any aspect expressed by the speaker to which the following applies: the speaker tries to talk to him/her about the object that fulfills his/her primary aspect, but is not himself/herself meant to be part of the truth conditions that the speaker wants to make. There must be a primary aspect to each secondary aspect. VI 169/170 Example: the man with the champagne in the glass over there. Even if it is water, the man is still standing over there. >Champagne example. The secondary aspect does not appear in the truth conditions. For example, we both look at the same man, even if he is not Smith's murderer. For example, even if Shakespeare did not exist at all, I can say: "Shakespeare did not design the figure of Ophelia as convincingly as the Hamlets." (Secondary aspect). Searle: this statement can also be true. - - - II 75 Aspect/Searle: an aspect has no intermediate instance like sensory data. ((s) Therefore, there is also no risk of regress as with all intermediate instances.) Searle: there is a morning star aspect and an evening star aspect of Venus. If it is not a case of perception, the intentional object is always represented under some aspect, but what is represented is the object and not the aspect! II 76 ff Rabbit-Duck-Head: Wittgenstein: the rabbit-duck-head exhibits various uses of the word "see". SearleVsWittgenstein: we see not only objects but also aspects. We love people, but also aspects. - - - III 185 Representation: each representation is bound to certain aspects, not to others. >Rabbit-Duck-Head._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18