Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

A priori: something that we can know without prior (empirical) investigation. Is the inventory of a priori certainties purely logical? Is a priori knowledge always necessary?
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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I 151
A Priori/McGinn: we have a number of cognitive abilities, which are based on innate foundations. - How is that possible?
It's a miracle that we know so much, much more surprising than e.g. our abilities to walk and lift. Of course, there are also scientifically unresolved issues here, but that does not threaten their ontological status.
I 165
A Priori/Transcendental Naturalism/TN/McGinn: we resemble three-dimensional beings that are equipped only with two-dimensional concepts.
In the case of empirical knowledge, we understand, after all, with what kind of things we are dealing.
I 166
A Priori/CAlM/Combinatorial Atomism with Lawlike Mappings/McGinn: Combinatorial Atomism with lawlike mapping deserts us with a priori: we cannot even formulate the kind of relationship that could be regulated by this scheme. We cannot even settle the corresponding facts in the realm of reality.
I 166
A Priori/Transcendental Naturalism: Transcendental Naturalism asserts that the relationship between consciousness and the brain did exist, but did not correspond to our thinking in form.
McGinn: unlike the topics discussed so far, the chances of the Transcendental Naturalism to apply to a priori seem rather low. For it is not able to transform something profoundly incoherent in one good piece of our world inventory.
I 170
A Priori/Transcendental Naturalism: due to the conceptual limits embedded in us, we will not succeed in establishing a unified theory about the a priori. It does not follow that we must correct any standard ideas.
Reason cannot establish a complete theory of itself.

C. McGinn
Die Grenzen vern├╝nftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

C. McGinn
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? M├╝nchen 2001

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-27