|Antirealism: (Michael Dummett) the thesis that it has to be possible to be shown through behavior that alternatives to an assumed fact could make a difference. In the case of undecidable sentences such as the number of geese on the Capitol this is not possible.|
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|Horwich I 393
Anti-Realism/Anti-RealismVsPhenomenalism/DummettVsHusserl: there is no basis of - "hard facts" (DummettVsSense Data) - Understanding/Dummett: to understand a sentence is to know what its verification would be. - N.B.: the sentence is verified by being spoken - ((s) In such and such circumstances) - Still not incorrigible - the sentence does not need to be bivalent. - Soft Fact/Putnam: self-affirmation of observation statements - N.B.: the realistic concept of truth and reference is not needed for that. - Therefore, no problem of the "right" (intended) reference relation - If we introduce reference a la Tarski, "'cow' refers to 'cows'" becomes a tautology. - Advantage: we need no metaphysical realism for understanding. - Verificationism: must then also be applied in the meta language. - i.e. we cannot use any hard facts (nor sense data). - Otherwise, Wittgenstein private language argument applies.
Putnam I 124
Anti-Realism/Dummett/Putnam: (like intuitionism) requires that a verification process is mastered. - Problem: we can never say what the knowledge of the truth conditions consists of -> Löwenheim: no problem for the Anti-Realism: since it is oriented at a process which must always be re-found. - It must only renounce models of verification. - With a rich meta-language it can introduce Tarski definitions that are model-independent. - It can then speak about models again.
It can even define reference a la Tarski.
Anti-Realism/Truth/Dummett: we need an "external" concept of truth (or accuracy) above Tarski's internal (tautological) equivalence: justified assertibility. - Not only by facts but by perceived and conceived states of affairs. - It's about justification conditions, not about mind-external truth conditions.
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994