Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Screenshot Tabelle Begriffe

Analytic/synthetic: achieved by decomposition or by composition. In philosophy analytically true = true according to the meaning of the components - synthetic insight = substantial expansion of knowledge.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
IV 57
Meaning/Quine: not from speaker meaning, not from acceptance of inferences of the speaker - the speaker meaning depends on the worldview from, and thus on an intention regarding what the words should mean - in this it is not possible to distinguish what views the speaker accepts a priori - So there are no analytic sentences - Vs a/s "true through meaning": there is no epistemic criterion for this.
IV 177ff
Analyticity/block/Dummett/Devitt/Bilgrami: VsQuine: perhaps "gradual A"? - Fodor/LeporeVs: would presuppose equal meaning instead of equal identity: Problem: in the end everything is "just about": sentences just about express propositions, because "John" refers just about to John - not analytical: e.g. "brown cows are dangerous" - no inference from -cows are dangerous and -brown things are dangerous- "therefore then no compositionality.
IV 186
Analyticity/analytical/Fodor/Lepore: if meanings are stereotypes, yet none of the individual features is defining - "E.g. the stereotypical brown cow can be dangerous, even though the stereotype dangerous does not match the stereotype brown or the stereotype cow " - hence the distinction analytic/synthetic fails - Important Argument: even if your reject the a/s distinction, it is clear that meanings are never stereotypes!.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Send Link
> Counter arguments against Fodor

Authors A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  

Concepts A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  

> Export as BibTeX Datei
Legal Notice & Contact   Data protection declaration

Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-06-21