Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Analytic/synthetic: achieved by decomposition or by composition. In philosophy analytically true = true according to the meaning of the components - synthetic insight = substantial expansion of knowledge._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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J. Fodor on Analyticity/Syntheticity - Dictionary of Arguments
IV 57 Meaning/Quine: meaning does not come from speaker meaning and not from the acceptance of inferences of the speaker. The speaker meaning depends on the worldview from, and thus on an intention regarding what the words should mean. In this it is not possible to distinguish what views the speaker accepts a priori. So there are no analytic sentences. Vs a/s "true through meaning": there is no epistemic criterion for this. >Criteria, >Speaker meaning, >Meaning, >Content, >Worldview. IV 177ff Analyticity/block/Dummett/Devitt/Bilgrami: VsQuine: perhaps we can assume a "gradual A"?. Fodor/LeporeVs: we presuppose equal meaning instead of equal identity. Problem: in the end everything is "just about": sentences are just about propositions of expression, because "John" refers just about to John. Not analytical: e.g. "brown cows are dangerous". Here, there is no inference from "cows are dangerous" and "brown things are dangerous". Therefore, there is no compositionality. IV 186 Analyticity/analytical/Fodor/Lepore: if meanings are stereotypes, however none of the individual features is defining. E.g. the stereotypical brown cow can be dangerous, even though the stereotype dangerous does not match the stereotype brown or the stereotype cow. Hence the distinction analytic/synthetic fails. Important argument: even if you reject the a/s distinction, it is clear that meanings are never stereotypes! >Stereotypes._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
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> Counter arguments in relation to Analyticity/Syntheticity
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19