Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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General Term: a word that does not single out individuals, but sets of objects which are determined by characteristics - contrast singular term. There are problems in relation to universals and reference.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

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I 102
Distinction singular/general term: independent from stimulus meaning - Name or general term for space-time segments: same stimulus meaning ("rabbitness").
I 212
Difference verb/noun/adjective: less important - difference singular term/general term is very important.
I 212
Abstract terms: alleged names of properties - "roundness": "F"/"round": "a" in "Fa" - should not be used carelessly without metaphysical determination - is thereby unbinding. - Each abstract singular term provides an abstract general term.
V 102
General term/Quine: E.g. has one more degree of freedom: can be different dogs - Fido: has only one degree of freedom. - ((s) temporal).
V 123
General term/Quine: E.g. animal, dog, body, built-in individuation. - General term: true - singular term: denominator function of particular." Problem: are learned as observation sentences - no reference on objects but return of mom is the return of a circumstance. - Therefore reference by general term because of individuation: singular term does not individuate. - Wrong: This is a Fido.
V 125
Individuation/general term/Quine: square is an individuating word - "(s) Fido, not: E.g. This is a Fido.
V 125
a) General term: E.g. "Square" in -This is a square- and E.g. -This is the same square as that one- b) singular term: E.g. "The square is a form". ((s) here, form is the general term; predication must always combine a singular term and a general term) - language-bound: E.g. Red is a color (general term). - Object-bound: E.g. -The square is a form: just like E.g. Fido is a dog (singular term).
V 126
Singular term/general term/Platonism/universalia/language acquisition/Quine: E.g. A dog is an animal - problem: different dogs are different animals - on the other hand, the square is a form says something about a single form, just like - "E.g. Fido is a dog". (s) Otherwise you would need two universalia: dogness and animality - platonistic/Quine: The dog is numerous.
- - -
VII 70
General term/Quine: "Red" and "River" are similar - but places are only conceptually connected with color, not like the parts of the river - this is not a question of abstractness - No "name" of any separated entity (as "attribute", "squareness") - general term in everyday language is often like a name - with "square" much like singular term (because of pointing) - with "red" no difference to singular term.
General term: 1) showing does not assume identity from occasion to occasion (unlike the case with the singular term) - 2) The general term is not a name of any separated entity.
VII 77
General term/Quine: is indispensable - probably originated from reaction similarity - to understand it one needs the operator "class of" or "-ness". - Missing these operators was the reason to assume "abstract entities".
VII 107 f
General term: E.g. "is a whale" or "can swim": may be regarded as names of classes - predicates: if they denote classes, they can be considered in a way that they have properties as their meaning. (>Church).

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

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> Counter arguments against Quine
> Counter arguments in relation to General Terms

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-02-23