Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Generality: refers to properties that are shared by multiple objects.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
I 203
Individual/General/TugendhatVsTradition: seen linguistically-analytically consciousness of the individual is just as sensual as of the Generality - but consciousness of General has in the similarity a sensual preform - Reference to individual therefore more problematic.
I 370
Generality/reference/singular Term/Tugendhat: indeed a reference to all objects (of an area) is presupposed with the singular term - but that is no real relation - the variety is somehow present to the consciousness - singular terms do not have to describe perceptible objects, also not indivdual objects.
I 462
Identification/Tugendhat: spatial and temporal relation between objects insufficient - an infinite number of space-time locations, finitely many objects - presupposed: space-time system - reference to space-time locations cannot fail - talk of existence without location pointless - Identification only by simultaneous reference to all other (possible) objects - therefore existence sentences in general.
I 478
Language/Reference/Tugendhat: direct reference by ostension no language.
I 479
Also with the demonstrative "here" the reference to all other is already posited.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2020-05-29
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