|Generality: refers to properties that are shared by multiple objects._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
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Distinction singular/general term: is independent from stimulus meaning. - Name or general term for space-time segments: the same stimulus meaning ("rabbitness").
Plural: abstract singular terms: "lions are dying out" - Disposition "eats mice" (31).
QuineVsProperties: fallacy of subtraction: deriving existence from "about" and "is about" - "round" and "dog" are terms for physical objects - but not properties! "Round" and "dog" are general terms for objects not singular terms for properties or classes.
The same argument would apply to classes instead of properties: general term symbolizes its extension as well as its intension.
Properties: not every general term necessarily speaks of properties or classes - properties and classes acceptable as values of variables.
Universality/Quine: ambiguous: a) different indices applicable - b) undivided quantification throughout an exhaustive universal class.
Tugendhat I 380
General statements/universality/Quine: These basic statements are general statements, and there are no singular statements at all - StrawsonVsQuine: it is the general statements themselves that refer to singular statements when specifying their truth conditions - one cannot explain the use of a general sentence without the precondition of the use of singular sentences._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953
Bezeichnung und Referenz
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992